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Contesting the Boundaries of Religion in Social Mobilization 
 
Joe Devine, Graham K. Brown and Séverine Deneulin 
 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to contribute to an understanding of the dynamics of religion in social mobilization. It 
argues that existing approaches to the study of the role of religion in social mobilization have been 
insufficiently nuanced and have failed to probe the multiple and often contradictory influences that 
religion can have on mobilization channels. On the basis of three qualitative case studies from Malaysia, 
Bangladesh and the United Kingdom, we identify three key factors of religion that can catalyse social 
mobilization: theological resources, religious spaces, and the interaction of both with the wider context. 
This leads us to conclude that the boundaries of the ‘religious’ dimension of social mobilization are fluid, 
and that the religious element of social mobilization can never be disentangled from its social and political 
context. 
 
Keywords: Religion, social mobilization, theology, politics 
Introduction 
In the late 1960s, Peter Berger – one of the world’s most renowned modern sociologists and 
former president of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion - argued that the emergence of 
modern economic systems would reduce the influence of religion in public life (Berger 1969). 
Building on the work of Max Weber, the core of Berger’s thesis was that as societies modernise 
religion would be driven from the public sphere to the private sphere. Today it is clear that the so 
called ‘secularization thesis’ has little or no traction in our global modern world. Even among the 
most industrialised countries, religion is alive and well; and there is consistent evidence of a 
resurgence of religious activities throughout the world (Norris and Inglehart, 2004:9).   
One of the key characteristics of religion is its role in social mobilization and action. There 
are a number of famous and recent examples of this kind of mobilization including the Iranian 
Islamic revolution in the late 1970s, the roles of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt, the recent opposition of Buddhist monks to the Burmese dictatorship, and the actions 
taken by the Catholic Church in communist Poland during the 1980s. However although these and 
similar cases have been well documented, the academic literature has on the whole failed to 
examine the mechanisms through which religion leads in some cases to social mobilization. This we 
argue, is a result of the ongoing influence of the secularization thesis in certain social sciences 
disciplines.  In a recent review published in Political Science & Politics for example, Steve Kettell 
(2012) examines the previous ten years of publishing in leading political science journals and found 
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that the discipline had failed to produce research related to religion. Sociology, he argues, fares 
better but is still some distance behind anthropology1. In explaining this lack of attention, Kettel 
argues that the intellectual framework for political science is rooted in assumptions about the 
declining influence of religion in modern public life. Assumptions which are not mirrored in reality. 
In this paper, we attempt to address this gap by proposing a framework able to better understand the 
dynamics of religion within social mobilization. We hypothesise that religious social mobilization 
contains three core factors that determine its shape.  
First are theological resources, by which we mean broadly the teachings, discourse, 
interpretation and knowledge associated with a religion which are used to inform practice. We are 
aware of the potential ambiguity of the phrase ‘theological resources’ but we want to use it here to 
capture the range of religious ideas, values and dogma which have a norm setting function. Within 
Christianity for example, theological resources encompass formal sources such as the Bible and the 
writings of theologians, but also embrace more informal, localised or popular theological 
expressions developed by communities. The significance of the latter should not be underestimated. 
It is widely recognised for example that the whole Liberation Theology movement was inspired by 
multiple ‘theologies of the masses’ (as opposed to what Gustavo Gutierrez described as the 
‘theology of the experts’) articulated by communities as they sought to make sense of and 
ultimately change their worlds (Gutierrez, 1983). Our case study on dalit social mobilization 
provides another good example of communities developing and adopting an alternative theological 
framework that rendered their worlds more meaningful, and facilitated greater social mobilization. 
Linked to the issue of theology is the key question of interpretation. How are theological resources 
interpreted in a given social context? Are theological resources more likely to be deployed in a 
violent way when a religion or its adherents are threatened violently? This was the conclusion 
reached by Appleby (2000) who argued that those who adhere to a religion and who live it radically 
may be tempted to resort to violence, especially when they face situations in which others use 
violence against them. How a religious community translates its core teachings into social practices, 
including social mobilizing, depends on the interpretative power of both leaders and believers at the 
grassroots level. For example, the social mobilization of the Catholic Church in Latin America in 
                                                          
1 In this article we rely on literature mostly from political science and international development 
studies. We agree with Kettel that anthropology has a much richer tradition of research into 
religion, and acknowledge here the anthropological literature which looks at the relation between 
religion and mobilization. Pertinent examples include Burdick (2011), Bradley (2011), Tomalin 
(2006), Mahmood (2005) and Darlington (1996). We thank one of the reviewers for drawing our 
attention to this rich anthropological tradition.   
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the 1970s and 1980s was greatly indebted to the interpretative power of the bishops who translated 
the documents of the Second Vatican Council within a context of authoritarianism, widespread 
poverty and inequality.  
A second key factor of religiously motivated social mobilization that we hypothesise is that 
of ‘religious spaces’. Like ‘theological resources’ the idea of ‘religious spaces is not without its 
ambiguity. We use it here again as a shorthand to refer to the physical spaces offered or used by 
religions such as churches or mosques, but also to the institutional channels offered by religions 
which facilitate room for manoeuvre, negotiation or engagement. ‘Religious spaces’ are often 
important because they can offer moral authority, social protection or political influence while 
remaining relatively insulated from political interference or control - even in undemocratic contexts. 
This has been particularly the case in authoritarian regimes where religious spaces were the only 
spaces that could be used for resisting political repression. In Brazil, for example, some churches 
were used during the dictatorship period (1964-1985) for trade union meetings because this form of 
activism was banned by the ruling regime. This was also the case for example during the apartheid 
period (1948-1994) in South Africa. After the banning of the ANC, the churches became the only 
place where social mobilization against apartheid could happen. Similarly, but perhaps to a lesser 
extent, the churches played a large role in the United States during the civil rights movements. The 
‘religious space’ became a political space where black people could articulate their concerns and 
acquire the skills for their non-violent resistance.  Our case of Broad Based Organizing in London 
gives a good example of religious space being used for social mobilization in a non dictatorship 
context. Space of course is not restricted to location.  In 2014, Cambridge University’s Partha 
Dasgupta and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, of the University of California, made an unprecedented 
plea to religious leaders to help in the battle against climate change. Part of their argument was that 
religions have the organization and are structured in such a way that makes them effective in 
tackling global issues such as climate change. In this case, religious space embraces institutional 
structure and organization  
Finally, we hypothesise that the dynamics of religious-based social mobilization crucially 
depends on the interaction between theological resources and religious spaces with other less 
‘religious’ and even secular grievances and demands. That the site of a church, mosque or temple 
can become a place of political resistance is ultimately explained by wider socio-political 
considerations and contexts. Religious sites have not become sites of political resistance in 
communist China, but they have been in communist Poland, apartheid South Africa or in the 
Brazilian military regime. Similarly for theological resources, the documents of Vatican II became a 
source of social mobilization for the Catholic Church in Latin America, but perhaps less so or less 
visibly so for Catholic Churches in other parts of the world.  
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We examine these three hypothesis using three disparate case studies of largely non-violent 
social mobilization that had an apparently ‘religious’ dimension: the Hindu Rights Action Front in 
Malaysia; Dalit political mobilization in Bangladesh; and a broad-based coalition in London. On the 
basis of these, we suggest that to better understand the role of religion in social mobilization it is 
important that we adopt and develop approaches that are sensitive to context and history. This 
stands in contrast to the more abstract and essentialised treatments of religion that dominate the 
academic and indeed policy literature. Before proceeding to these case studies and the testing of our 
hypotheses, we return to review the literature on different approaches for analyzing religion, and 
more specifically for analyzing the role of religion in social mobilization. 
 
Challenges of Researching Religion  
Earlier we alluded to Kettel’s (2012) review which found an alarming lack of attention to religion in 
core political science journals. Although sociology makes more references, it still falls short of the 
attention paid by anthropology. We traced these observations to the ongoing significance of 
secularism in the main intellectual frameworks guiding some of the major social sciences literature. 
In much of this literature, religion is treated primarily as a ‘place-holder’ – in some cases simply as 
a categorical variable into which individuals fall but that has no significance beyond this categorical 
division of the population. This approach is dominant in quantitative analyses found in political 
science, sociology and economics in which synthetic measures of social diversity – fractionalization 
or polarization – are employed. In this approach, ‘religion’ is treated as an alternative but 
theoretically identical means of estimating social diversity as ‘ethnicity’. Examples of such studies 
include Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) who, employing aggregate data on ethno-linguistic and 
religious diversity in a cross-country panel analysis, find that religious polarization increases the 
risk of civil conflict whilst ethno-linguistic polarization does not. Similarly, but in a less 
quantitative vein, Posner (2005) uses ‘religion’ as a ‘category set’ to divide the population 
alongside race, tribe, language, region or nationality, and the dynamics of identity politics becomes 
primarily a numbers game. Political entrepreneurs call upon these identity sets to the extent that 
they offer them the best opportunity to engage in a ‘minimum winning coalition’.  
While this kind of approach allows for large scale, cross-sectional studies, it also has 
obvious shortcomings, not least of which that it largely ignores the qualitative ‘content’ of religion 
– something that becomes evident as soon as one begins to probe the ‘categories’ of religion more 
carefully. Is ‘Islam’ a single category, for instance, or should it be sub-divided into ‘Sunni Islam’ 
and ‘Shi’a Islam’, which in turn can be subdivided between the Ismaili and other Shia groups? De 
Juan’s recent (2014) analysis of differences within (as opposed to between) religious traditions in 
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Thailand, Iran and the Philippines is a stark reminder of the need to look carefully at how religious 
communities are organised internally in order to better understand how they act externally.  
Other approaches have tended to see religion as a distinctive social category that requires 
special treatment (Deneulin and Rakodi, 2011). Here two main approaches to religion can be found: 
the ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’. According to the former, religion is a set of private beliefs in the mind of 
the believer, which are then manifested through public worship. This approach has its roots in the 
influential work of Max Weber, has been influential in much of the research suggesting a demise of 
religion at least in the public sphere (see above on Berger, 1969), and is still prominent in a 
significant amount of research into religion today. In this kind of research, ‘religious data’ is often 
captured through and read off attendance to religious ceremonies or performances of religious 
rituals. Norris and Inglehart (2004) for example use the World Values Survey data on religious 
worship attendance to establish a correlation between a country’s levels of income and inequality 
and its religiosity. They conclude that the poorer and insecure the conditions of life, the greater the 
attendance to religious worship. The key variable of concern here is religiosity rather than religion 
per se. In the discipline of economics, religion is also predominantly treated in the static mode.2 
Adopting this kind of approach, Feldmann’s (2007) econometric study for example finds that 
countries in which a large proportion of the population attends Protestant religious worship have 
substantially higher labour participation rates, a finding that is especially true among women. In a 
very similar vein, the literature on social capital finds a negative correlation between ‘hierarchical 
religions’ and social trust and economic growth (La Porta et al., 1997; O’Rourke, 2007). 
Another interpretation of religion, i.e. the dynamic one, emphasises the historical and 
political construction of the very idea of ‘religion’. Thomas (2005) for example argues that it was 
the ‘wars of religion’ in sixteenth century Europe, which created the idea of ‘religion’ as a belief 
system, a set of propositional truths that one could ascend to, separate from history and politics. 
Religion is therefore not a set of static beliefs but something that is always deeply intertwined with 
dynamic historical and political processes (Devine and White, 2013). Within this interpretation, 
religion is best conceived as a heterogeneous lived social phenomenon, which never ceases to be 
redefined because people continue to re-interpret core religious teachings within the contexts in 
which they live (Deneulin with Bano, 2009). This approach rests clearly on an interpretivist 
methodology which recognises the importance of practices and institutions in the constitution and 
reproduction of social reality and meaning. Research on religion is, we would contend, therefore 
fundamentally about understanding the inter-subjective and common meanings that people give to 
their (religious) actions or religious adherence. 
                                                          
2 See Jackson and Fleischer (2007) for a review of the literature on religion and economics. 
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Religion and social mobilization 
It is the latter (i.e. dynamic) approach which is particularly helpful for understanding the role of 
religion in social mobilization because it enables us to explore the reasons why people may turn to 
religion to mobilize around particular causes or issues. This approach also gives special attention to 
the wider political, social and economic context which nurtures particular interpretations of religion 
in a way that leads to social mobilization. Among the reasons for religiously motivated social 
mobilization that are found in the existing literature, there are the perceived broad differences in 
world outlook between religions, and the extent to which these differences are perceived as a threat 
to a religion, its practices and teachings.3 De Juan’s incisive study (2014) reminds us that the same 
differences can be as pertinent and powerful within particular religious traditions living in the same 
socio-economic and political contexts. 
 Other studies have been more concerned with the organizational and network features of 
institutionalized religions, particularly under conditions of restricted or absent democracy. This 
literature is largely linked to ‘political opportunity’ models of social mobilization (Tarrow, 1996).  
In many non-democratic contexts, religious institutions have been relatively protected from political 
oppression and have hence provided a venue for social mobilization and contestation. The churches 
in South Africa for example played a large role in the demise of the apartheid regime (Borer, 1996), 
as did Catholic opposition to Martial Law in the Philippines (Moreno, 2007) or to the dictatorships 
of Central and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s (de Gruchy, 1995). Similarly, but in a very 
different context, Parsa (2000) has argued that the rise and ultimate victory of the Khomeini faction 
during the Iranian revolution was due in large part to the fact that under the Shah, ‘all options for 
mobilization were blocked, except the mosque’ (Parsa, 2000: 290).  
The organizational and political space afforded to religion is a two-edged sword. While it 
may provide a relatively protected mobilizational resource for grievances and protest movements 
that are primarily non-religious, the same space can also close down other opportunities, 
particularly in divided societies. Thus, for instance, Parsa’s study of the Iranian revolution suggests 
that the Islamic fundamentalism of the Khomeini faction was by no means supported by the 
majority of Iran’s would-be revolutionaries, including students, but the channelling of protest 
through the mosques ultimately allowed Khomeini to seize power. In less dramatic circumstances, 
Brown (2004) argues that the mosque and mosque networks were vital to the mobilization and 
                                                          
3 This refers to the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis (Huntington, 1993), which was primarily concerned with 
international conflicts, but has subsequently been widely applied to exploring the dynamics of intra-state 
conflict. See for example Ellingsen (2005); Fox (2001) and Pearce (2005).   
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spread of the pro-democracy reformasi movement in Malaysia, but that this also had the effect of 
alienating non-Muslim support for the movement. 
Within the social movements literature, attention to religion has shifted in recent years 
following a broader intellectual ‘cultural turn’ (Johnston and Klandermans, 1995), which recognizes 
that the structural approach to social movement analysis prevalent in the preceding decades was not 
able to adequately capture the dynamics of collective action and contentious politics. In more recent 
social movements literature therefore, religion is often seen as representing ‘a valuable resource for 
the task of collective identity construction and mobilization’ (Smith, 1996: 17-20). 
Within this interpretative context, Appleby’s identification of the ‘ambivalence of the 
sacred’ (see also Philpott, 2007) has been influential in identifying religion as a potential source 
both of violence and of peace and reconciliation, as well as in pointing to the theological framing 
role of religious elites as key to determining the trajectory of mobilization (Appleby, 2000; see also 
de Juan, 2014). The ‘clash of civilizations’ predicted by Huntington is recast as a ‘clash within’ 
(Nussbaum, 2007), in which religious violence emerges not out of a contestation between religious 
groups but out of a contestation over toleration and democratic ideals within religious groups (de 
Juan, 2014). 
While the literature that speaks directly or indirectly to this ‘ambivalence of the sacred’ has 
generated a more nuanced and contextualized understanding of the dynamics of religion and 
violence, it has tended to contribute to a somewhat reified polarization of grassroots-versus-elites, 
whereby explanations of the violent potential of the ‘sacred’ revolve around the entrepreneurial and 
manipulative programmes of religious elites, while the non-violent is largely associated with 
‘grassroots’ movements and networks. In the context of India for example, Brass (1997, 2003) and 
Wilkinson (2004) have sought to explain the incidence and location of communal conflict by 
exploring the extent to which such violence benefits particular political elites, and have analysed the 
‘institutionalized riot systems’ through which such elites are seen to manufacture violence for their 
own benefit. On the other hand, Varshney’s (2002) research highlights the extent to which dense 
inter-community grassroots networks have played a role in keeping some Indian cities peaceful, 
even while nearby and otherwise similarly constituted cities that lack such networks have 
experienced endemic religious rioting. In Southern Thailand, religious mobilization by Islamic 
elites has been blamed for the rise of secessionism (Chalk, 2001), while popular grassroots 
observation of ‘cosmological commonalities’ between Islam and Buddhism has been invoked to 
explain why such violence was not more historically prevalent (Horstmann, 2004). 
Our concern in this article is to explore the ways in which the use of theological resources 
and religious spaces in social mobilization interact with each other and with ‘non-religious’ 
processes found in the wider social and political context. We do so through three case studies of 
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largely non-violent social movements, all having a religious basis, in three very different contexts. 
One is drawn from a quintessentially plural middle income country, Malaysia; one is drawn from a 
primarily homogenous country officially classified as a low income country, Bangladesh; and, the 
final case is drawn from a developed country with a moderate degree of ethnic and religious 
diversity, the UK. The cases were purposively selected, however, for what they share in common: 
while religion appears to have played a role in their social mobilization, they have not been 
primarily ‘religious’ movements. By exploring these cases comparatively, we draw attention to the 
ways in which ‘religion’ as a mobilizing force is complex, contested and contingent on many other 
factors besides ‘religion’. 
 
Three cases 
The HINDRAF movement in Malaysia 
A paradigmatic case for the study of ethnic politics (Horowitz, 1985; Lijphart, 1977), comparative 
political scientists rarely afford much attention to the dynamics of religious mobilization in 
Malaysia, although Malaysianists – both local and international – have paid considerable attention 
to Islamic revivalism as a growing political phenomenon (Brown, 2009; Hussin Mutalib, 1991; 
Nagata, 1997). Over the past decade, they also started noting and attempting to explain the relative 
quiescence of the Indian community in responding to the increasing marginalization of sections of 
the population (Loh, 2003).   
Since 2007, however, quiescence is no longer an issue. In November 2007, a massive rally 
of Indians was organized under the banner of the newly formed Hindu Rights Action Front 
(HINDRAF), following a series of smaller demonstrations. The protest was violently repressed, 
HINDRAF was banned and its organizers were detained without trial. The protests nonetheless 
continued and the Indian vote deserted the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition in March 2008 
with, according to some analyses, an 80% swing in Indian votes from the BN to the opposition. The 
protests had also an instrumental role in the fall of four state governments to the opposition parties 
(Brown, 2008). Yet while religious markers were evident both in the events leading up to the main 
rally – particularly the destruction of Hindu temples – and evident in the name of the organization 
itself, the HINDRAF movement rapidly disassociated itself from a religious Hindu agenda and 
focused on ethnic Indian claims, such that both critics and supporters of HINDRAF now explicit 
deny that the movement has any religious connotations.4 
To understand the role of ethnic and religious dimensions of HINDRAF, it is necessary to 
take a look at the diversity of the Indian population within Malaysia. Mostly migrating to colonial 
                                                          
4 First expressed through personal communications in December 2008.  
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Malaya as indentured labour for the plantation industry and to staff the colonial bureaucracy, the 
Indian community is probably the most socially and religiously heterogeneous of the ‘races’ that 
make up Malaysia’s multiethnic plurality. According to the 2000 census, around 85 per cent of 
Indian Malaysians are Hindu, 7.4 per cent Christian, and 3.9 per cent Muslim; the remainder fall 
into much smaller categories such as Buddhist and Confucian.5  This religious diversity within the 
Indian community largely coincided with class divisions – the Indian brought to staff the civil 
services were largely Christianized, while the indentured labourers were overwhelmingly Hindu. 
These religious class division have largely remain intact over the post-colonial era, such that in 
2000, Christian Indians were the most highly educated major ethno-religious group in the country 
with over 25 per cent of 18-35 years old with university education in 2000; Hindu Indians were 
among the least well educated, with an equivalent figure of around 11 per cent.  
This division is largely representative of the original colonial migration policy, reinforced 
by the greater availability of education to Christian families through mission-backed schools. While 
for many decades after independence, less educated Hindu Indians were concentrated in the rubber-
tapping plantation industry, the collapse of rubber prices in the mid-1980s and the concomitant shift 
toward less labour intensive palm oil has seen a substantial proportion of the Indian workers move 
to the city in search of employment, where they have come in some areas to constitute an urban 
underclass (Loh, 2003; Wilford, 2006).   
Social discontent among urban Indians was for many exacerbated by their inability to access 
anti-poverty programmes under the pro-Malay affirmative action policies that the BN regime has 
implemented since the early 1970s. This resulted in a growing perception among Indians – rich and 
poor alike – that Malay poverty was not tolerated by the government, but that Indian poverty was a 
matter of little concern. Such has been the clear pressure from below on this that leaders of the 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), the senior Indian party within the BN coalition, have on 
occasion criticized government policy and called for remedial pro-Indian policies.  
After the change of administration from Mahathir Mohamad to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in 
2003, however, another vein of social discontent rapidly emerged among the Indian population. 
Initially highly popular among most ethnic groups6 the premiership of Abdullah rapidly lost support 
among non-Muslim communities as he began pushing a more stridently pro-Islamic agenda than his 
largely secular predecessor, Mahathir. Among the Indian community, as well as sympathetic 
members of other communities, particular alarm was raised by a series of demolitions of Hindu 
                                                          
5 Data here are the authors’ calculations from 2000 Census sample (MPC 2009). 
6 Abdullah led the BN to its largest ever electoral victory in 2004, garnering around 61 per cent of the vote 
including an estimated 73 per cent of Indian votes (Brown, 2008). 
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temples that stood in the way of large development projects. Most, if not all, of these temples were 
built on ‘squatter’ land – land for which titles had never been issued and which was technically 
illegally occupied, albeit for more than fifty years of independence – and government figures 
claimed that the temple committees had been offered relocation compensation, which had been 
refused. This was nonetheless taken by many within and beyond the Indian community as clear 
indication of the ‘second class’ status of their religion7 – it was seen as utterly inconceivable that 
similar actions would have been taken against a mosque. 
As the number of demolitions increased and news of these gained coverage, particularly on 
the Internet, the organization HINDRAF was formed. Led by three Hindu lawyers, P. Waytha 
Moorthy, P. Uthayamoorty, and M. Manohan, the organization issued a ‘petition’ of demands to 
address the marginalization and exclusion of the Indian community. Most of the HINDRAF 
demands related to socio-economic grievances, although there was also reference to the perceived 
persecution of non-Muslim faiths. Waytha Moorthy simultaneously launched two high profile legal 
actions. In the Malaysian courts, he sought to obtain a ruling to strike out Article 153 of the 
Malaysian Constitution which allows the ‘Special Rights’ of indigenous groups; in the British 
courts, he issued a £4 trillion class action law suit claiming compensation for Indians brought to 
Malaya as indentured labour, similar to the slavery compensation class actions in the USA. At the 
same time, Uthayamoorty and other HINDRAF coordinators became regular participants in 
demonstrations around temple destructions, seeking to prevent police entry and being arrested on 
numerous occasions. Videos of the increasingly violent confrontations rapidly circulated, and 
participation grew.   
In November 2007, HINDRAF organized a demonstration in central Kuala Lumpur to push 
its claims. Attended by at least 20,000 people of all ethnic groups, the demonstration was the largest 
protest in the country since the Reformasi protests in 1998. The protest was broken up by riot police 
with tear gas; several hundred arrests were made and seven protestors even charged with the 
attempted murder of a policeman. HINDRAF was declared illegal, and Uthayamoorthy and 
Manohan were detained without trial; Waytha Moorthy fled the country and remained in self-
imposed exile, primarily in London.   
A few months later came the shock collapse of the BN vote in the March 2008 election, in 
which the BN lost its constitution-amending two-thirds majority for the first time. Manohan and 
Uthayamoorthy both ran as candidates from prison and won; Sami Vellu, the previous unassailable 
leader of the MIC who had controlled the party since 1978, lost his seat. The results signalled the 
beginning of the end for Abdullah’s administration, and he handed over to his deputy, Najib bin 
                                                          
7 Personal communication, December 2008. 
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Razak, in April 2009. Temple demolitions stopped and the government began actively courting 
Indian grievances. At the same time, HINDRAF supporters and activists clearly began to steer clear 
of religious discourse, returning to the theme of ethnic marginalization.   
 
Dalit activism in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh has a population of around 140 million people and despite some recent remarkable 
signs of development success, it remains one of the world’s poorest countries. Poverty and indeed 
extreme poverty are concentrated in particular geographical areas of the country, and there are 
certain groups residing in the country whose poverty has proved to be extreme, persistent and inter-
generational (Devine and Wood 2009). One of these groups is the dalits, a term that has been 
recently adopted by some of the country’s Hindu untouchable groups. Although no precise figures 
exist, it is estimated that there are between five and six million dalits living in Bangladesh and these 
consist mostly of Hindu untouchable communities but also some Muslim and Christian groups.8 
Most of the country’s dalits can therefore be described as a ‘minority within a minority’, i.e., 
members of a religious minority in a predominantly Muslim country and then having the lowest 
status within the minority.  
Even a cursory glance at a range of basic human development indicators demonstrates 
clearly that members of dalit communities suffer higher levels of poverty and lower levels of access 
to key public services. Thus dalits tend to have lower access to capital assets, lower wages, lower 
literacy rates, poorer housing conditions and poorer health (IIDS, 2008). The present condition of 
the dalit communities however cannot be understood without taking into account the powerful 
dynamics of stigma and discrimination, which across South Asia are intimately tied to notions of 
purity and pollution (Iversen and Raghavendra, 2006). The term ‘dalit’ encompasses a number of 
groups who are normally more locally known by their traditional occupations such as sweepers, pig 
farmers, cobblers, palanquin bearers and so forth. All of these professions are considered impure 
and polluting9 and as such dalit communities tend to be kept at a physical as well as social distance 
from other communities. Therefore one of the key reasons why dalits have lower levels of literacy 
is that they are often prevented from entering schools because it is believed that their presence will 
defile the premises. The same reason is often used to prevent them from accessing key health care 
services. On the other hand, their subordinate status means that dalits are dependent on higher 
castes and dominant non Hindu elites for employment opportunities and access to other basic 
livelihood goods and services. Needless to say the terms of such dependent relations never favour 
                                                          
8 Caste systems are normally associated with Hinduism but in Bangladesh, practices of caste discrimination 
can be found also among Muslim and Christian communities (IDSN, 2008). 
9 The Bengali terms used to describe these professions are almost always derogatory terms.  
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the dalits. Moreover these forms of caste discrimination and subordination reproduce themselves 
across generations. Thus even if sons do not carry out the same occupation as their fathers or 
convert away from the religion of their fathers, or leave their father’s house and emigrate elsewhere, 
more often than not, they end up experiencing similar levels of discrimination and exclusion. Caste, 
it seems, is embedded in the DNA10.  
The pattern of discrimination is widespread, engrained in everyday social interactions and de 
facto sanctioned, perhaps through omission, by the state. The constitution of Bangladesh guarantees 
equal rights for all its citizens, and issues such as caste discrimination barely register on the political 
barometer. The extent of ‘caste blindness’ is demonstrated clearly in the country’s 2005 Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper where is it acknowledged that  
[i]n Bangladesh there are some small groups of extremely disadvantaged poor people with 
very distinct characteristics. They belong to some specific occupation, and are a community 
isolated and disconnected from the mainstream population. Although in Bangladesh there is 
not caste system per se, these groups are treated the way lower castes are treated as 
untouchables in a caste system (PRSP 5.420, italics added) 
In 2002, the Bangladesh Dalits’ Human Rights (BDHR) was established by a group of activists 
committed to overturning the discrimination suffered by the country’s dalit communities. Initially 
focusing on securing jobs for dalits as professional sweepers in the capital city of Dhaka, BDHR 
grew by establishing links with a number of national and international organizations working with 
dalit communities. The explicit adoption of the name ‘dalit’ was significant. Dalit is a Marathi word 
meaning ‘oppressed’, ‘broken’ or ‘crushed’. As Zene (2007) rightly reports, it is a provocative and 
intensely political term. In Bangladesh, dalits are more commonly referred to as ‘untouchables’, a 
derogatory and externally imposed term. ‘Dalit’ on the other hand invokes images of resistance, 
struggle, agency, self-determination and self-ascribed identity – an affirmation of dalits’ humanity 
(Zene, 2007). In terms of mobilization and social action therefore, the adoption of the term dalit 
significantly raises the political stakes. In the case of BDHR, it signalled a more deliberate move to 
                                                          
10 In India of course the question of the social mobility of dalits has received far more attention from 
researchers, politicians, activists and policy makers. Perhaps not surprisingly, the evidence about mobility 
points in equal measure to reversals and triumphs, change and continuity. Thus we have cases demonstrating 
the declining significance of caste in rituals and food habits (Kapur et al, 2010); the dilution of the link 
between caste and occupation (Madsen and Gardella, 2009); the increased significance of migration (Iversen 
and Raghavendra ,2006), education (Jeffry et al, 2004), and the securing of non traditional occupations 
(Iversen and Raghavendra, 2006) for social mobility; and the greater exercise of agency and political 
activism by lower castes themselves (Khare, 1991). All of these contribute to processes, which seem to 
improve in some cases the relative position of dalits. However even in cases of apparent mobility, it seems 
that the influence of caste identity and politics continues to have profound and negative impacts in India, 
especially on those at the lower end of the hierarchical ladder (Desai and Dubey, 2012).  
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articulate a moral, social and political critique of those elites whose actions and behaviour 
‘oppressed’ the dalit (Khare, 1991). The momentum built around this new form of dalit activism 
took a further step forward in April 2008 when a new platform called the Bangladesh Dalit and 
Excluded Rights Movement (BDERM) was created. This platform evolved from the early work of 
BDHR and sought to create stronger and larger alliances that would be more effective in bringing 
about changes for dalit communities and other excluded groups.  
The emergence of BDHR and then BDERM signals an important development in dalit 
identity politics in Bangladesh, and offers a direct challenge to those denying first the existence and 
second the discrimination suffered by dalits. These national initiatives have been accompanied by 
no less significant developments at local levels. For example over the past decade in the south west 
of Bangladesh, the region with the highest concentration of dalit communities,11 a number of 
community based organizations and non-governmental organizations have been established and led 
by young men and women from the dalit communities themselves (see Mosse, 1999 for similar 
observations in Tamil Nadu). These initiatives have played an important role in mobilizing 
communities locally, and lobbying to ensure the situation of the dalits are recognized and respected, 
and their oppressive conditions properly addressed. These local initiatives in particular are peppered 
with stories of struggle, protest, social activism and sometimes, violent confrontations.  
The mobilization of dalit communities at national and local levels has to some extent 
dragged the issue of caste out of political oblivion. This raises a number of key questions including: 
why has this particular form of mobilization evolved? why has it occurred at this particular time? In 
answering these questions, we draw on insights especially from the experience of dalit communities 
in the south west of Bangladesh.  
When looking at the issue of dalit mobilization in the south west, one of the most important 
factors to be considered is the relationship that can be traced back to at least the 1850s between 
Catholic missionaries and dalit communities. Although the relationship has always been complex 
and ambiguous (Zene, 2002), it is not surprising to see that dalits chose to build connections with 
foreign missionaries. As Mosse has argued in the context of Tamil Nadu, emancipatory movements 
of dalits tend to coalesce around new relations and not normally around existing relations with 
higher castes or elites who have oppressed the dalits (Mosse, 1999). Missionaries working in the 
region turned their attention to the dalit communities after realising that they were not welcome 
among the Muslims and higher caste Hindu communities. Dalit communities on the other hand 
responded more positively to the missionaries because they offered the prospect of greater 
livelihood protection and security. However different missionary congregations came and then left 
                                                          
11 There are at least twenty different Dalit groups in the region (Rahman, 1993). 
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the South West region, frustrated or disillusioned by the apparent lack of a ‘spiritual response’ of 
the dalit communities. Targa (u.d) rightly argues that in many ways these early missionaries were 
equipped with a theology that considered conversion as the only positive outcome of missionary 
activity. Within this, early missionaries also perceived the ‘untouchability question’ as a primarily 
religious issue, which could and should be resolved via conversion. This framework changed 
however with the Second Vatican Council in the mid-1960s which revolutionised the theological 
underpinnings of missionary activity. One of the key changes of the Second Vatican Council was a 
repositioning of the relation between Church and the world, and the legitimate acceptance of a 
theology that was less focused on the discipline of religious adherence and practise  and more on 
questions of social justice and political participation. As such, boundaries that once separated the 
‘social’ from the ‘religious’, the ‘this world’ from the ‘other-world’ were redrawn; and new forms 
of missionary activity emerged which engaged more explicitly with the social, political and 
economic worlds of groups like the dalits.  
Inspired by the new theology, some missionaries in the South West region of Bangladesh 
abandoned the traditional parish structures and began living among dalit communities. Discussions 
around conversion were also abandoned or at least suspended as missionaries began to encourage 
and support the dalits to reflect more on the dynamics of their discrimination; to find new 
articulations of identity not in the bible but in their own Hindu scriptures and traditions; and to 
begin the task of imagining a future in which they could live with greater autonomy, dignity and 
agency -  an approach which contrasted sharply with the pervious theology of conversion. In some 
instances, this meant the dalits had to reflect on their own lifestyles and change those aspects (for 
example poisoning of cows and eating carrion) which encouraged their social marginalisation. In 
other instances, missionaries were active in promoting socio-economic development initiatives 
among dalits such as agricultural extension activities, health and education programmes and 
employment skills development projects. Perhaps more creatively, they also found ways to help the 
dalits better understand their own scriptures and theology, and to explore alternative theological 
narratives that countered the more orthodox discourses which inter alia legitimised their oppressed 
status. These alternative theological narratives allowed dalits to reassess their position within the 
wider Hindu community, understand better the social and theological ‘justifications’ of their 
subordination, and begin to construct an alternative politics of agency and autonomy. Zene (2007) 
argues that the idiom of religion and myth became for these ‘ex untouchable’ communities a point 
of resistance which enabled them to think of an alternative life in which their dignity and rights 
were respected. This was captured in the phrase amrao je manush (we are also people) which 
became a motif of mobilization for a number of dalits. It is important not to underestimate the 
significance of this new sense of consciousness because many dalits refused to embrace it, and  
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many non-dalits mocked it and tried to derail it with threats and sanctions being handed out to those 
questioning the status quo. Very slowly and notwithstanding the many challenges, a new generation 
of dalits emerged who were more vocal about their rights and much more aware of the many 
reasons that kept them subordinate. Importantly in embracing a new awareness of their situation, 
they had to reconstruct a new and alternative theological discourse in which dalits had dignity and 
rights. The new awareness triggered observable changes of behaviour. For example while 
previously many dalits changed their surnames in an attempt to disguise their past and hide their 
identity, today many keep their caste surnames and are not as ashamed of their backgrounds. This 
may appear a small and perhaps insignificant change. It is not. As one dalit friend put it: ‘If we hide 
from ourselves how can we stand up to others’.12 Gorringe observed similar patterns in India, 
describing them as ‘an inversion of hegemonic cultural values’ (Gorringe 2005:663). As we will see 
below, for the dalits in the south west of Bangladesh the articulation of a new identity became the 
necessary platform for a new project articulated human rights and entitlements.  
Although dalit communities are among the poorest and most excluded in Bangladesh, it is 
evident that those with longer association with the missionary groups have made important 
advances in terms of socio-economic development. There are a number of reasons for this. First, 
some missionaries became direct implementers of development related projects such as promoting 
small scale business enterprises or supporting the provision of education and health services. These 
were set up purposively to help dalit communities. Second, missionaries also used their authority 
and influence to encourage external development organizations to implement programmes among 
the dalit communities.13 Recently this has moved in a new direction. New NGOs have emerged and 
these have been established and managed by dalits themselves. Missionaries have actively 
supported these developments primarily by identifying new educated leaders from among the dalit 
communities and then finding funds to support the development of the new organisations. Mosse 
(1999) found similar patterns and developments among untouchable communities in Tamil Nadu, 
arguing that for the untouchables the links to missionaries represented a move away from traditional 
dominating elites, and the establishment of locally run NGOs was important because it represented 
a move away from their identification with low status serving roles.  
Milon Das, a dalit and the executive director of an NGO from the south west region, was 
among the first cohort of his community to complete, with the help of local missionaries, his formal 
primary education in the early 1990s. He was also among those who were supported by 
                                                          
12 Personal communication, March 2009. 
13 Although Bangladesh has one of the largest NGO sectors in the world, most of the organizations are not 
interested in working with dalits (IDSN, 2008). The main exceptions are those NGOs with links to 
missionaries working in the area.  
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missionaries to reflect more on the dynamics of caste discrimination and encouraged to think of 
alternative theologies and identities. As a young adolescent, Milon was involved in a local dispute 
following an altercation with a local restaurant owner. At the restaurant Milon’s food was served on 
a piece of paper rather than a plate and the owner refused to serve him a glass of water for fear that 
if he served the ‘son of a dalit’, his business would be in ruins (see Iversen and Raghavendra, 2006 
and Madsen and Gardella, 2009 for detailed analysis of the politics of commensality as a key 
feature of caste relations and evidence of a degree of secularization or democratization of food 
preparing and serving in India). In the public hearing organized to settle the dispute, Milon was 
found guilty of unruly behaviour and of making wrong complaints against the restaurant owner, and 
was warned that he would be excommunicated from the community if anything similar happened in 
the future. This experience was an important formative moment in Milon’s life. 
In 1993, Milon and a few of his dalit classmates set up a Students Organization and gave it 
the name ‘Parittran’ which in Bengali means ‘liberation’. The organization was run by the dalit 
students and supported by local catholic missionaries. The organization gradually expanded and 
soon became an important focal point for local struggles involving dalits. The emergence of new 
leaders and new organizations like Parittran has had an impact on both the dynamics of the 
relationship between missionaries and dalit communities, and the success of mobilization efforts. 
For years, before the emergence of groups like Parittran, missionaries tended to take the initiative 
and use their influence to advance the ‘dalit agenda’. On the whole these initiatives had limited 
success partly because they relied on individual missionaries. Now instead local dalit leaders and 
organizations are at the forefront of the dalit struggle and this has had a marked and positive 
difference in the mobilization of dalit issues in Bangladesh.  
In his discussion of the dilemmas and challenges facing dalit mobilization in India, Gorringe 
(2005) argues that the internationalisation of the human rights discourse has opened up new and 
important possibilities. First of all it offers a legitimate authoritative space in which dalit concerns 
can be placed firmly or more centrally on the agenda. Importantly, as Gorringe notes, this space is 
of a higher authority than even the State. Secondly, the human right discourse enables caste 
mobilization to break out of the narrow confines of casteism and align with other important 
struggles. A similar ‘breaking out’ is evident in Bangladesh as different dalit organizations come 
together and establish alliances with like minded activists under a broader human rights banner. The 
BDERM is an obvious illustration of this. Since its establishment, BDERM has built up a profile as 
an organization focusing on the human rights of dalit communities and so far has had some success 
as a forum which raises issues around caste in Bangladesh. Initiatives such as the publication of a 
manifesto that was delivered to the main political parties contesting the parliamentary elections of 
December 2008, and a submission to the UN fourth Universal Periodic Review for Bangladesh held 
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in February 2009 indicate that BDERM’s legitimacy and authority as an organisation leading the 
dalit struggle in Bangladesh, are growing.  
Although the BDERM has taken the issue of caste discrimination in Bangladesh to new 
heights and arguably increased the visibility and impact of dalit mobilization, it is not a platform 
without its controversy. One of the key tensions concerns the extent to which dalits are in control of 
their mobilization and struggles. A leader of a local dalit organization asked one of the authors for 
advice on whether or not he should join the BDERM. His main concern was that the platform was a 
coalition led by mostly urban-based, middle-class non-dalits: ‘The platform may be useful but it is 
run by people who are not dalits. They see us as victims like many others in Bangladesh. We see 
ourselves as dalits. We have a new identity and we are respected more. It has taken us years to get 
to this point. Of course we need to talk about dalit rights and now is the time to do so. But we need 
to take our struggle forward ourselves, and not be led by others. On the other hand, if we don’t join 
with others, we will always remain isolated’.14  The argument is complex. On the one hand, there 
seems to be some recognition that the articulation of a new sense of alternative identity is a 
necessary but not sufficient step in promoting a new politics of caste. Second, it is not clear whether 
universal discourses like human rights are able to recognise and embrace local realities and needs. 
Indeed there is a strong suggestion that universal human rights discourses may actually dilute the 
focus on caste – hence the statement that ‘they see us as victims’. Finally, there remains the 
question of whether the NGO leader can afford to turn his back on the platform and try to ‘go it 
alone’. These concerns remain unanswered to date and yet remain at the heart of the politics of dalit 
mobilization in Bangladesh today. It seems that the future success of dalit mobilisation will in part 
depend on striking the right balance between ‘local’ and more ‘global’ articulations of identity and 
aspiration.  
 
Broad-based organizing in London 
In the 1980s, against a background of Thatcherism and social dislocation, the Citizens Organizing 
Foundation (COF) was set up in the United Kingdom, inspired by the model of broad-based 
organizing pioneered by Saul Alinsky in the slums of Chicago in the 1930s (Alinsky, 1971). The 
creation of COF was largely facilitated by the ‘Church Urban Fund’ of the Church of England. The 
Fund aimed to regenerate British inner cities, whose dismal conditions were documented in the 
Church Report ‘Faith in the City’ published in 1985 (Wills and Jamoul, 2008). Broad-based 
organizing is a type of social mobilization which seeks to create alliances between various groups in 
local, often divided, communities to mobilize on common issues that the groups face. Typically the 
                                                          
14 Personal communication, March 2009. 
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groups will target issues which they consider to be winnable. These may include improved social 
housing, better safety in public areas, solving local environmental problems like the closure of a 
polluting factory or the creation of recreational areas for children. Broad-based organizing is 
community focused, centred around local problems rather than broader issues such as fighting 
climate change or reforming the social security system. This does not mean however that broad-
based organizing is only limited to local issues because many of the local issues facing communities 
are often linked to wider national and even international issues. 
What is central to broad-based organizing is its financial independence from government. 
Member organizations pay an annual fee and this enables them to retain political autonomy and 
independence. Another key characteristic of broad-based organizing is that groups focus on what 
unites the members rather than on issues which might divide them. Thus for example members of a 
mosque, a church and community groups can mobilize together to improve safety in their 
neighbourhoods even if on other matters such as homosexuality or abortion they may hold different, 
even polar views. This allows broad-based organizing for example to draw specifically on a group’s 
religious identity while campaigning around non-religious issues, as the story of the London branch 
of the Citizens Organizing Foundation, London Citizens, illustrates.  
In the mid 1990s, the East London Citizens Organization (TELCO) emerged as a broad-
based organizing initiative around local problems faced by the marginalized and ethnically divided 
communities of East London. It later expanded to include other London communities and became  
known as ‘London Citizens’. It is now a broad-based coalition of more than 80 organizations, both 
religious and secular, which act together to build better neighbourhoods in London.15 Instead of 
engaging directly in party politics, the coalition puts pressure on existing political structures to 
make sure the desired changes are introduced. Two of its recent campaigns are of special interest to 
our discussion on mobilization. 
At the turn of the millennium, TELCO initiated a campaign to introduce a living wage16 for 
low-paid workers in London which would adjust the national minimum wage to the living costs of 
the capital. The campaign was successful and more than 5,000 cleaners in London were awarded an 
increased remuneration in line with the living wage.17 Religion acted as a strong mobilizing force in 
                                                          
15 See www.londoncitizens.org.uk. 
16 The living wage is based on the amount an individual needs to earn to cover the basic costs of living. 
Since living costs vary in different parts of the country, there is a different rate for London and the rest of the 
UK. Debates over the living wage are currently high on the political agenda in the UK. 
17 See the ESRC research project led by Prof Jane Wills at Queen Mary University of London at 
http://www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/livingwage. The project focused on the ‘Living Wage campaign’ as a new form 
of political and social mobilization outside the traditional political channels of political parties and electoral 
politics. 
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the campaign (Wills and Jamoul, 2008). The success of the campaign contrasted with the general 
sense of disillusionment felt towards traditional political channels; the de facto steep decline in 
trade union membership which can be traced back to the late 1970s; and many other civil society 
initiatives which tended to be dominated by white middle-class people and had very low civic 
engagement of low-paid workers (Wills and Jamoul, 2008). The latter is exacerbated by the so-
called ‘flexibility’ of labour which adds to workers’ overall vulnerability and discourages their 
participation in unions or other groups that might represent their interests politically. In the TELCO 
campaign, places of worship were often the only point of contact where low-paid workers could 
come together and find help and support. The involvement of churches, mosques and other places 
of religious worship was central to the success of the TELCO campaign.  
Another campaign supported by London Citizens was called ‘Strangers into Citizens’.18 It 
ran from 2007 till 2010.  This campaign sought to regularize the situation of illegal or 
undocumented workers who had been living and working in Britain for more than 6 years, could 
speak English fluently, had no criminal records, and were able to provide references. As in the case 
of the living wage campaign, sites of worship were important places where the immigrants could 
organize themselves. In May 2009, the campaign organized a number of events which were held 
around the Parliament building including a Mass for Catholic immigrants in which no less than 50 
ethnic Catholic chaplaincies were represented; a service of public worship in the Central Methodist 
Hall; a communion service at the Anglican St Margaret’s Church behind Westminster Abbey; and a 
political rally in front of the House of Commons. This campaign reflected the hybrid character of 
broad-based organizing, and its unique ability to mobilize secular and religious organizations 
around a common cause – in this case, to demand better treatment of illegal immigrants in London. 
In both the Living Wage and Strangers into Citizens campaigns, religious locations turned 
into spaces where it was possible to mobilise and articulate alternative political agendas. This was 
necessary because more traditional spaces such as those associated with party politics or trade 
unions were not available to the immigrants. Since the immigrants were illegal, they could neither 
vote nor join a trade union and so they were forced to find alternative channels to advance their 
claims. Here the churches and ethnic chaplaincies took on a key role and offered the migrants not 
only a place to worship but also a place to organise themselves and articulate their demands for 
recognition and respect.  
The lack of traditional political channels is not the only reason religious locations or spaces 
can become sites to mobilize around alternative political agendas. In some instances, religious 
leaders can also take on important leadership roles. As Willis (2008: 7) points out in the context of 
                                                          
18 See http://www.strangersintocitizens.org.uk/ 
  20 
the living wage campaign: “[w]hereas employers tend to resist trade union organizers, they were 
often more open to developing a dialogue with faith and community leaders from the campaign.” 
One of the actions of the Living Wage campaign was to attend the General Assembly of the 
shareholders of HSBC (London Citizens had bought a few shares that entitled them to participate in 
the Assembly). The campaigners were led by the Catholic bishop of Brentwood. When they 
confronted the CEO of HSBC about the low pay of cleaners, the CEO protested arguing that HSBC 
was giving £2 million of donations to charities every year. The bishop replied ‘That is all very well 
but what is called for here is not charity but justice’. HSBC consequently agreed to pay its cleaners 
according to the living wage.19 In a similar way, the Catholic Archbishop of Westminster played a 
leading role in the Strangers into Citizens campaign, and this helped the social movement gain 
credibility and respect, and also made grassroots members feel supported and encouraged.  
The link between religion and social mobilization in London is not only mediated by the 
interaction between religious locations and their political environment, it also rests on theological 
resources which enable believers to engage in social action from their faith’s perspective. As a 
Muslim campaigner put it: ‘The Prophet says whomsoever amongst you sees an evil act, let him 
stop it with his hand. If he is unable to do that, let him stop it with his tongue. If I don’t say nothing 
then that’s the sin on me’ (quoted in Willis, 2008: 7).20 At the gathering Mass for migrant workers, 
the auxiliary bishop of the Diocese of Southwark preached that ‘we as the church will do all we can 
not to allow migrant workers to become scapegoats and targets of peoples’ frustration with the 
economy’. He referred to the long tradition of the Church to stand alongside the poor and the 
oppressed, and argued that at a time of economic downturn, the Church had a duty to protect 
migrants.21 
People join these campaigns because they are associated with specific member organizations 
of London Citizens, i.e. as members of for example a specific church, mosque, faith centre, 
religious community and so forth. However, the campaigns transcend these specific affiliations to 
focus on an agreed project such as creating a better neighbourhood or improving living conditions 
in London. Through this common action, a new identity emerges, i.e. that of belonging to London 
Citizens or that of being a political campaigner or that of being a British citizen. This new sense of 
identity is captured nicely in the following quote from a member of the East London Mosque: ‘I’ve 
become more British in a way. There was a time when I used to fell like an outsider in society, 
                                                          
19 Austen Ivereigh, ‘Power to the People’, The Tablet, 25 November 2006. 
20 See also Jamoul and Wills (2008) for more interviews focusing on the faith motivations of people involved 
in the Living Wage campaign. 
21 News report by the think tank Ekklesia, 5th May 2009. 
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where I was not interacting with any non-Muslims or people from other communities. So now, I 
communicate with anyone’ (quoted in Wills and Jamoul, 2008). 
 
Contesting the religious boundaries in social mobilization 
A key theme that emerges from the three case studies is the way in which ‘religious’ mobilization is 
linked to rather more earthly issues of class, socio-economic inequality and injustice, and 
marginalization. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give an historical account of the involvement 
of religious groups in politics and their social mobilization potential. However what is clear is that 
there is no immediate or obvious link between believing in God and reading the Bible or the Qur’an 
on the one hand and social mobilization on the other. This has to be mediated by social, political 
and theological contexts, which are deeply connected and intertwined (Devine and White, 2013). 
There were workers who were paid below subsistence levels in thirteenth century Europe, yet 
believers did not campaign then for justice and for a just wage. It is only in the nineteenth century 
that the pursuit of justice became the concern of some believers in Europe, and this was prompted 
by a major external factor: the industrialisation of Europe and the rise of communism. The churches 
began to lose their members because socialist organizations were better able to respond to workers’ 
concerns. Given communist pressure, the Church was forced to respond. What followed was a 
series of official documents which linked the Bible with the humanization of economic, social and 
political structures.22  
There is therefore no such thing as pure ‘religious-based social mobilization’. Religion is 
not an abstract motivation, it is always contextualised. The role of religion in social mobilization 
cannot therefore be assumed independently of non-religious factors such as history, socio-economic 
developments and political contexts. It is precisely the context which allows for religious-based 
mobilization – even of non-religious issues -  and determines their chance of success or failure. 
Our three case studies illustrate this, with very different dynamics. In the case of the 
HINDRAF movement in Malaysia, it is clear that religious language and religious concerns were 
used instrumentally by ethnic activists who were able to see the potential to mobilize others 
following the temple demolitions. Beyond the name Hindu Rights Action Front, there was little 
religious content to the movement at all. It lacked religious leadership and, most importantly, it did 
not draw on theological resources. But what the movement did exploit with devastating 
                                                          
22 The first publication was in 1891 with the encyclical Rerum Novarum which constitutes the starting point 
of what is known as ‘Catholic Social Thought’, a body of documents which discusses the links between faith 
and involvement in justice, peace and integrity of creation (Hornsby-Smith, 2006). The last such document is 
Caritas in Veritate published by Benedict XVI in July 2009, which calls for ‘integral human development’ to 
guide economic, social, political, cultural and technological processes. 
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effectiveness was the dimension of religion as a sacred space and, in particular, the violation of that 
space by government policy.  It is worth reminding ourselves here of the particular overlap between 
class and religion within the Indian Malaysian community and the relatively unusual position of the 
three HINDRAF leaders as highly paid Hindu professionals. Far more than the socio-economic 
grievances that have been growing among the Hindu population for more than two decades, it was 
the novel and emotive message of, for want of a less emotive word, desecration that galvanized the 
Indian community and brought sympathetic responses from other groups, particularly other non-
Muslim organizations that felt equally threatened by Abdullah’s Islamization policies.   
Why, then, did the religious dimension of the HINDRAF movement not ‘take on a life of its 
own’, in the way that Parsa (2000), for instance, noted for Islamic radicalism in the Shah’s Iran? 
One possible explanation may lie in the non-hierarchical and decentralized nature of Hinduism. 
There are two arguments that question this hypothesis. First, the hindutva movement in India 
flourished. Second, in many ways Islam, like Hinduism, lacks extensive hierarchical structures. 
Another possible explanation points to the high capacity of the Malaysian state for civil (as opposed 
to military) repression and the non-secular nature of the Malaysian regime. Islam is the official 
religion of the country, shari’a law has been implemented for Muslims since independence, 
proselytization of other faiths among Muslims is forbidden, and apostasy comes with a heavy legal 
price including whipping, fines, and potentially limitless detention. Malays, who are all Muslim by 
constitutional definition, are effectively prevented from officially converting away from Islam. 
Perceived challenges to the dominance of Islam have met with furious responses from Malay and 
Muslim organizations. In such a context, a political calculus would caution against making strong 
religious claims. 
A final important point to make is the conservativeness of the HINDRAF agenda. It did 
nothing to challenge the ethnic basis of politics in Malaysia, indeed it was premised upon such 
ethnic stratification. It did not even challenge the legitimacy of ethnic affirmative action as a 
principle; it simply sought the extension of these privileges to other groups. The only radical 
element of the programme – the calls for secularism and religious status equality – were rapidly 
dropped in the face of repression and resistance. Religion is thus not a mobilizing factor on its own. 
Images of desecration and violation of the ‘sacred space’ were invoked with enormous effect, but 
were equally quickly and effectively silenced. 
In contrast to the Malaysian case, religious leadership and theological resources did play a 
key role in the mobilization processes in Bangladesh and London. Without the support of religious 
leadership, the Living Wage mobilization would not have been as successful in achieving its aims. 
Similarly, the Strangers into Citizens campaign received the strong backing of the Head of the 
Catholic Church of England and Wales – and one could even add that there would be no broad-
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based organizing in the UK had the Church of England not initiated it in the 1980s. The pivotal role 
of religious leadership lies also at the more grassroots level. When a new priest who is not 
sympathetic to a theology of social action (for example sceptical of the reforms of the Second 
Vatican Council) arrives in a parish, the congregation is in many ways powerless.23 Also, not all 
places of worship in inner-city London are members of London Citizens, even if they have large 
congregations of low-paid workers and migrants. Some local church leaders remain opposed to a 
more social action interpretation of the Gospel or the Qur’an, and if this is the case, they are 
unlikely to join initiatives such as London Citizens. This decision in effect means that the 
congregation is also unlikely to participate.  
In Bangladesh, it was the reworking and reinterpreting of theological resources, facilitated 
by the Catholic missionaries, which became a pre-condition to the social mobilization of dalit 
communities. Again the development of these resources was not alien from changes in the wider 
economic, social and political context. The Second Vatican Council’s decision to encourage greater 
social involvement of missionaries was part of the response of the Church which wanted to ‘be in 
the world’ in a different way.24 What is striking in the case of Bangladesh is the inter-faith nature in 
which theological resources were developed for social mobilization. Catholic missionaries helped 
Hindu dalits reinterpret their own traditions and supported a process in which the dalits developed 
an alternative theology that affirmed their dignity. The dynamics of social mobilization among the 
dalits in Bangladesh has more recently taken a new turn with greater emphasis being placed on the 
international discourse of human rights. As indicated earlier, the initial work around building a new 
awareness of dalits’ humanity and dignity can be seen as a precondition for their more active 
engagement in the human rights discourse. Mobilisation around human rights is an emerging 
agenda for the dalits in Bangladesh and it is not possible to predict how it will evolve. However 
what seems clear is that the future many dalit activists aspire to is now more clearly linked with and 
fashioned by a reinterpretation of past theologies.  
While it is the context, linked to a dearth of theological resources, which prevented religious 
spaces to become a source of social mobilization in Malaysia, it is a combination of these same 
elements, context and theological resources, which enabled social mobilization in Bangladesh and 
London. In both cases however, it is not religion as such which becomes the mobilization force, but 
its interaction with other variables. In London, religion has helped open up alternative political 
spaces for some who cannot access party politics or trade union activism, and for others who are 
simply disillusioned with the effectiveness of traditional political channels to bring about change in 
                                                          
23 A Catholic church left London Citizens after the arrival of a new priest. Members of the congregation who 
wished to remain involved had to change parish (personal communication). 
24 For the consequences of the Second Vatican Council for development, see Deneulin with Bano (2009). 
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their lives. Similarly in Bangladesh, Catholic missionaries helped dalits identify and then mobilise 
around political spaces and opportunities which had been denied to them because of their caste 
position. 
  
Conclusion 
This article seeks to fill a particular gap that derives from a combination of two observations. First, 
it is clear that religion has, and continues today to play a central and sometimes primary role in 
social mobilization. Second however, our understanding of the role of religion in social 
mobilization is weak and insufficiently nuanced. In our view, this second observation is the result of 
a bias evident in much of the literature to treat religion as an independent and analytically separate 
domain, and to equate it too readily with abstract beliefs, doctrines and practices. This produces a 
narrow and ultimately reductionist analysis of religion. Instead we argue for a more dynamic 
approach to understanding the role of religion in social mobilization. In this approach, religion is 
enmeshed in everyday social and political contexts and the potential for mobilization lies in how 
these different contexts interact and evolve in specific places and times. The premise of our 
argument is therefore that the role of religion in social mobilization is inherently contextual and 
such it is inevitably variable, unpredictable and contested.  
We chose to look at three case studies of social mobilization that were familiar to us, have 
been relatively successful in their objectives, and have been characterized, to some extent, as 
‘religious’. Our analysis identified three key factors that influenced the shape the different 
mobilizations took: theological resources, religious spaces and their interaction with the wider 
context. In each of the cases, the different mechanisms combined and evolved in distinctive ways 
and so doing, opened up new opportunities for mobilization. Our analysis leads us to two overriding 
conclusions. First, while our cases were linked to practical welfare-orientated concerns none, we 
would argue, could be simply reduced to this. The mobilizations were about meaning, identity, 
recognition and respect as well as about material gain or political advancement. While our cases 
cannot be described as religious mobilizations, there is no doubt that religion played a significant 
role in giving shape to the mobilizations. Second, the role of religion in all the cases evolved as the 
mobilizations advanced. In some instances, it was prominent; in others, almost absent. This is 
consistent with our argument that religion is an area of life that is intimately connected with other 
areas such as economics, politics and society. Religion is neither a static nor abstract aspect of life 
but one that is affected by, and in turn affects, the organization of different aspects of life, and the 
relations between them. As such religion is always being worked upon and transformed. It is in 
these iterations, as opposed to a narrow focus on religion in the abstract, where we are likely to 
identify what if any role religion plays in social mobilization, and understand its significance. 
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Locating our analysis of religion in wider social contexts not only better specifies the role of 
religion but will also help us better understand the ongoing significance of religion in broader social 
change.  
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